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ABSTRACT: The challenge of accommodating difference has traditionally proved highly 
problematic for cosmopolitanism proposals, given their inherently universalistic thrust.  
Today, however, we are acutely aware that in failing to give difference its due, we stand to 
perpetrate a significant injustice through negating precisely what differentiates diverse 
groupings and confers on them their identity.  Moreover, in an increasingly pluralistic and 
multicultural world it has become clear that doing justice to difference is an essential 
prerequisite for the internal flourishing as well as peaceable coexistence of diverse cultural and 
other groupings.  Accordingly, as a corrective for the homogenising presuppositions of highly a 
universalistic and decontextualised template like the Habermasian, the present paper defends 
the need for a situated, dialogical approach that can not only accommodate difference but also 
treat it as a resource for promoting mutual understanding and potentially transformative 
learning. In thus defending the merits of a situated, dialogical template, the present paper also 
seeks to shed light on the conditions of its possibility.  To this end, I argue the need to 
transcend significant structural limitations inherent in the Habermasian discourse model, 
while aspring to preserve and enhance its distinctive strengths.  Accordingly, I press the case 
for a thoroughgoing reappropriation of such core Habermasian tenets as the symmetrical 
reciprocity requirement, the anticipation of consensus as outcome, and a one-sided emphasis 
on argumentative deliberation as the sole acceptable means of achieving this.  Proceeding 
thus, I defend the merits of a situated cosmopolitanism grounded in plurivocal transformative 
dialogue as a counterbalance to an unqualified universalism.  Correlatively, I defend openness 
to otherness under appropriately structured dialogical conditions as the primary prerequisite 
for a viable cosmopolitanism capable of meeting the needs of an increasingly pluralistic and 
globalised world.  In the process, some notable points of contrast with Richard Shapcott's 
dialogical template are identified. 
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Following Kant, cosmopolitan proposals have traditionally been highly universalistic 
in conception.  As such, while they have the merit of highlighting what all peoples 
share in common, they correspondingly neglect what differentiates diversely situated 
others.  In thus emphasising our common humanity to the extent of neglecting 
significant national, cultural, or ethnic differences, they unwittingly perpetrate an 
injustice by negating precisely those factors that confer on diverse groupings their 
identity.1  The Habermasian discourse model, centring on a discursive 
reappropriation of Kant, is a case in point.  Nonetheless, as discursively grounded, it 
embodies distinctive strengths worth preserving.  
Most notably, following Kant, it empowers us as citizens to be the authors of the 
laws and policies by which we are governed, while, departing from Kant, it valorises 
deliberative discourse as the basis for underwriting this possibility in a 
‘postmetaphysical’ era.2  Moreover, in that it conceives of us, as participants in 
discourse, as truly global citizens with the potential to transcend cultural and ethnic as 
well as national boundaries, the Habermasian template is genuinely cosmopolitan.  
Through its commitment to inclusiveness, it further reinforces its cosmopolitan 
credentials.  But herein lies the rub.  In promoting an unqualified universalism as the 
basis for inclusiveness, the Habermasian discourse model cannot do justice to 
difference in its concrete particularity.  On the contrary, we shall see, it emphasises 
the homogeneity, uniformity, and hence interchangeability of participant standpoints 
so heavily that it cannot take account of what differentiates these and renders them 
distinctive.  In thus emphasising the standpoint of the ‘generalised other’ to the extent 
of neglecting the standpoint of the ‘concrete other’, it discounts their specific histories, 
identities, and life experiences, thereby negating the distinctive contribution that 
diversely situated others could make to the deliberative process.  The present paper 
contends that a thoroughgoing dialogical reappropriation of the discourse model is 
needed to enable it to live up to its pluralistic and inclusive intent.  Moreover, far from 
being an external imposition, such a reappropriation serves to liberate the dialogical 
                                                     
1 As epitomised by Shapcott, the problem is that cosmopolitanism ‘is seen as championing universal 
justice and membership of the human community at the expense of cultural diversity and membership of 
particular communities, with the result that ‘universal cosmopolitan justice’ continues to be seen ‘as in 
conflict with the goal of maintaining cultural diversity and justice to difference’ (see Richard Shapcott, 
Justice, Community, and Dialogue in International Relations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 
31).   
2 Robert Fine and Will Smith, ‘Jurgen Habermas's Theory of Cosmopolitanism’, Constellations, vol. 10, no. 
4, 2003, pp. 469-87, p. 481. 
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potential inherent in the deliberative template from the outset but masked by its 
undue emphasis on homogeneity, uniformity, and consensus.3 
In thus highlighting the importance of situatedness, contextuality and difference, 
the present proposal shares much in common with other recent cosmopolitan 
proposals that could qualify as ‘situated’.4  It also has affinities with ‘critical’5 and 
‘emancipatory’6  cosmopolitanism.  Of these it has the closest affinities with Shapcott’s 
dialogical cosmopolitanism, in that both have been strongly influenced by Hans-
Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics.  Nonetheless, the aim of the present 
project differs significantly from Shapcott’s.  Thus, while Shapcott undertakes a 
systematic extrapolation of the significance of Gadamer's dialogical hermeneutics for 
contemporary cosmopolitan theorising, the present paper seeks to vindicate the 
contention that a commitment to doing justice to difference in a manner 
commensurate with the inclusiveness requirement of the discourse model calls for its 
dialogical reappropriation.  In the process, it seeks to clarify the conditions of the 
possibility for genuine dialogical engagement with others.  As we shall see, 
notwithstanding a common hermeneutico-dialogical affiliation, these differences in 
guiding orientation give rise to some significant differences in how the dialogical 
template is conceptualised.   
As a first step, let us consider how the case for a dialogical reappropriation of the 
discourse model receives impetus from the need to transcend the traditional 
universalism/particularism divide.   
TOWARD SITUATED OPENNESS TO OTHERNESS 
Of their very nature, then, traditional cosmopolitan proposals suffer from the 
significant limitation that they tend to exclude difference.  In discursive terms, the 
problem is that while committed to affording all participants a voice, they nonetheless 
perpetrate an injustice through overlooking or negating the very factors that 
differentiate diverse traditions or standpoints from others and that confer on them 
                                                     
3 Hence, while, as we shall see, in its standard formulation the discourse model fails to live up to this 
potential, commentators nonetheless routinely to attribute dialogical attributes to it.  In the debate about 
cosmopolitanism, Andrew Linklater is a case in point (see further Shapcott, Justice, Community, and Dialogue 
in International Relations, e.g., pp. 87, 94, 95, 169).  
4 E.g. Shapcott, Justice, Community, and Dialogue in International Relations, Werbner, ‘Vernacular 
Cosmopolitanism’, Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 23, no. 2-3, 2006, pp. 496-98. 
5 Gerard Delanty, ‘The Cosmopolitan Imagination: Critical Cosmopolitanism and Social Theory’, The 
British Journal of Sociology, vol. 57, no. 1, 2006, pp. 25-47. 
6 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, ‘Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism: Towards an Agenda’, Development and Change, 
vol. 37, no. 6, 2006, pp. 1247-57. 
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their identity.  In other words, the problem is that traditional cosmopolitan proposals 
perpetrate an injustice by valorising universalism at the expense of particularism.  
This problem is compounded by the ever-present threat that universalism will 
degenerate into an ‘ethnocentric universalism’, whereby one culture or tradition 
becomes the standard to which all must conform and with reference to which they are 
judged.7  
Benhabib’s distinction between the ‘generalised’ and ‘concrete’ other provides a 
helpful reference point for further conceptualising what is at issue.8  Briefly stated, the 
point is that, as inherently universalising, cosmopolitan proposals promote the 
standpoint of the ‘generalized other’ at the expense of that of the ‘concrete other’, and 
correspondingly discount the specific histories, identities, and life experiences of 
diversely situated others.9  In thus valorising the standpoint of the generalised other at 
the expense of the concrete other, not only does the discourse model perpetrate an 
injustice by discounting what differentiates us in our situated particularity, it also 
negates the distinctive situated knowledge that diversely situated participants could 
bring to the discursive process, to the detriment of participants’ ability to come to 
understand the issues needing attention in their multifaceted complexity and hence to 
contribute effectively to their resolution.  Another way of making this point which has 
important implications for what follows is that, in valorising the standpoint of the 
generalised at the expense of the concrete other, heavily universalising orientations, 
like the Habermasian, promote a presumption in favour of the homogeneity, 
uniformity, and hence interchangeability of participant standpoints, at the expense of 
a concern with what differentiates them and renders them distinctive.10  To counteract 
                                                     
7 Thus for example, in the debate about the cross-cultural implementation of human rights an 
unqualified universalism can all too easily degenerate into what has been termed a ‘parochial 
universalism’, which inadvertently valorises Western liberal values and standards at the expense of those 
of other cultures (see further Paul Healy, ‘Human Rights and Intercultural Relations: A Heremeneutico-
Dialogical Approach’, Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol. 32, no. 4, 2006, pp. 513-41.). 
8 Seyla Benhabib, ‘The Utopian Dimension in Communicative Ethics’, in David  Ingram and Julia 
Simon-Ingram (eds.), Critical Theory: The Essential Readings, New York, Paragon House, 1991, pp. 388-99, 
pp. 395-6.. 
9 Thus, as Benhabib puts it: ‘The standpoint of the “generalized other” requires us to view each and 
every individual as a rational being entitled to the same rights and duties we would want to ascribe to 
ourselves.  In assuming this perspective, we abstract from the individuality and concrete identity of the 
other.’  (‘The Utopian Dimension in Communicative Ethics’, p. 395) 
10 Notably too, as Benhabib recognises, in the case of the Habermasian discourse model, this is no mere 
contingent by-product but is directly related to Habermas' early endorsement of the concept of an ‘ideal 
speech situation’.  While this idealization fulfils the important function of providing a concise 
summary of the conditions needed to render discursive interaction between participants open and 
equitable, it does so in a way that effectively neutralises differences in participant standpoint and renders 
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this kind of abstract universalism, what is needed is the incorporation of a standpoint 
which  
requires us to view each and every rational being as an individual with a 
concrete history, identity, and affective-emotional constitution.  In assuming this 
standpoint, we abstract from what constitutes our commonality and seek to 
understand the distinctiveness of the other.11 
Equally clearly, however, the problem cannot be resolved simply by reverting to a 
one-sidedly particularistic orientation as this would simply perpetrate an imbalance in 
the opposite direction, emphasising difference to the point of excluding commonalities 
and hence precluding the possibility of real contact and communication between 
diversely situated others.  Instead, a viable contemporary cosmopolitanism must strike 
a better balance between universalism and particularism,12 and hence between the 
generalised and the concrete other.  As already noted, a full resolution of the problem 
presupposes undertaking a thoroughgoing dialogical reappropriation of the discourse 
model and elucidating the conditions of its possibility.  As a first step in this direction, 
the present paper valorises adoption of a stance of ‘situated openness’ to otherness, 
akin to the ‘world openness’ lauded by Delanty as a constitutive necessity for an 
appropriately post-universalistic cosmopolitanism.13  As we shall see, it thus seeks to 
combine an openness to engaging with the generalised other with a commitment to 
engaging with concretes others in their situated particularity. 
From this starting point, we need to go on to reassess other taken-for-granted 
presuppositions of the discourse model with a view to testing their credentials for 
inclusion as constitutive features of a viable situated cosmopolitanism.  In particular, it 
is now time to reappraise the ‘symmetrical reciprocity’ requirement which enjoins us 
to put ourselves ‘in the shoes’ of the other as a prerequisite for experiencing the 
situation from their perspective, with a view to making the case that, in the interests of 
doing justice to difference, it needs to give way to a more textured and responsive 
dialogical reciprocity. 
                                                                                                                                           
them interchangeable, thereby promoting the illusion of mirror imagery, as discussed further in the next 
section.  For more on this idealisation and its limitations, see Paul Healy, Rationality, Hermeneutics and 
Dialogue: Toward a Viable Postfoundationalist Account of Rationality, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005, pp. 21-4. 
11 Benhabib, ‘The Utopian Dimension in Communicative Ethics’, p. 396. 
12 Delanty’s (2002) exploration of models of European identity provides an interesting case study on the 
need for reconciling universalism and particularism (see Gerard Delanty, ‘Models of European Identity: 
Reconciling Universalism and Particularism’, Perspectives on European Politics & Society, vol. 3, no. 3, 2002, 
pp. 345-59.)  As Delanty notes and as considered further below, cosmopolitanism has both universalistic 
and a particularistic ‘moment’, and the core challenge is to reconcile ‘thick particularistic identities’ and 
‘thin universalistic ones’ (e.g., p. 346). 
13 Delanty, ‘The Cosmopolitan Imagination: Critical Cosmopolitanism and Social Theory’. 
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TOWARD DIALOGICAL RECIPROCITY 
At first sight, the symmetry requirement, which enjoins us to put ourselves in the 
shoes of the other and experience the situation from their perspective, would seem to 
be an unqualified asset in promoting respect for difference.14  On closer analysis, 
however, it too can be seen to embody strong presuppositions of homogeneity and 
uniformity which prevent it from doing justice to difference.  To correct for this 
presumption of ‘mirror imagery’, Iris Young has defended the substitution of 
asymmetrical for symmetrical reciprocity.  However, taking a cue from Simpson,15 the 
present paper contends that instead of a simple inversion a dialogical reappropriation 
is called for.  A brief review of key themes in the Young/Simpson ‘exchange’ will help 
vindicate this contention. 
As Young has it,16 notwithstanding its positive intent, the symmetry requirement is 
not only impossible to fulfil but counterproductive as well.  It is impossible to fulfil 
because the injunction to trade places with the other embodies a presupposition of 
mutual identification that cannot stand up to critical scrutiny.  Essentially, this is 
because far from being a mirror image of oneself, the other’s standpoint embodies 
distinctive features that cannot be vicariously experienced by a differently situated 
other.  In particular, significant divergences in life experiences and personal histories 
prevent us from directly stepping into the shoes of the other and experiencing the 
situation just as they do.  In addition, there are numerous other situational variables 
that differentiate our standpoints and that thwart the possibility of interchangeability.  
Importantly, however, the symmetry requirement also proves to be counterproductive 
because in perpetrating the illusion of interchangeability, it effectively desensitises us 
to crucial differences between standpoints.  In thus inadvertently negating the very 
awareness of difference that it is intended to promote, it actually precludes the 
possibility of truly understanding the other, and simultaneously forecloses invaluable 
opportunities for mutual learning by impeding the ‘creative exchange’ these 
differences could produce in the interactions between differently situated others.17  
Young contends that what is required as a corrective is that we invert the standard 
                                                     
14 The symmetry requirement, deriving from Habermas' insistence on the need for mutual respect and 
reciprocity, is an especially prominent feature of Benhabib’s reappropriation of the Habermasian 
template (see, e.g., Seyla Benhabib, ‘Toward a Deliberative model of Democratic Legitimacy’, in Seyla 
Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, Princeton, NJ, Princeton 
University Press, 1996, pp. 67-94).. 
15 Lorenzo Simpson, The Unfinished Project: Toward a Postmetaphysical Humanism, London, Routledge, 2001.. 
16 Iris Marion Young, ‘Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged Thought’, 
Constellations, vol. 3, no. 3, 1997, pp. 341-63. 
17 Ibid, p. 347. 
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requirement by substituting asymmetrical for symmetrical reciprocity, thereby 
acknowledging that, surface similarities notwithstanding, ultimately ‘each position and 
perspective transcends the other, goes beyond their possibility to share or imagine’.18   
Challenging Young's assumption that a simple inversion will suffice, Simpson 
highlights the limitations of a one-sided emphasis on asymmetry.  In particular, by 
over-accentuating the differences between standpoints, it could easily mislead us into 
thinking that we could never really understand an other, construed as so very different 
from ourselves.  To correct for the deficiencies of both asymmetrical and symmetrical 
reciprocity, Simpson defends the need for dialogical engagement as the requisite basis 
for coming to understand the other in a manner that is genuinely attentive to, and 
respectful of, difference.  In particular, he highlights the potential for gaining an 
increasingly attuned and enriched understanding of the other’s situation through 
engaging in a ‘reversibility of perspectives’ grounded in ‘the back and forth of 
hermeneutic dialogue’.19  Importantly, a dialogical commitment to achieving a 
textured understanding of the other’s position does not presuppose trading places with 
them or even bracketing our own standpoint.  Rather, what the ‘respectful 
understanding of another’ calls for is a willingness to embark on ‘a mutual dialectic of 
recognition’, whereby each side’ strives to attain ‘an understanding of what the other 
takes herself to be doing’, and where each ‘can raise critical questions about the 
other’s position’, and issue ‘reciprocal rejoinders’.20  Not only does this mode of 
dialogical interaction with the other hold open the prospect of acquiring a textured 
understanding of how others experience their situation, it also enhances the prospects 
of learning from them about new possibilities for thinking, doing and being.  
Elaborating, Simpson points out that as we engage in the requisite ‘reversibility of 
perspectives, our experiential horizon, composed of background assumptions and 
values that shape our interpretation of the world, can be broadened in such a way 
that those assumptions and values can be situated as just one possibility alongside the 
different assumptions and values of a formerly unfamiliar [viewpoint]’.21  In other 
words, as hermeneutic theorists have it, appropriately structured dialogical 
engagement with the other can result in a productive ‘fusion of horizons’,22 whereby 
in the process of attaining a more textured understanding of the other’s situation, we 
                                                     
18 Ibid, p. 351. 
19 Simpson, The Unfinished Project: Toward a Postmetaphysical Humanism, p. 105. 
20 Ibid., p. 80. 
21 Ibid., p. 79. 
22 Cf. Healy, Rationality, Hermeneutics and Dialogue: Toward a Viable Postfoundationalist Account of Rationality, p. 
46, Darren R. Walhof, ‘Bringing the Deliberative Back In: Gadamer on Conversation and 
Understanding’, Contemporary Political Theory, vol. 4, 2005, pp. 154-74, pp. 164-68. 
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can attain insight into an expanded range of possibilities for collective action, beyond 
those initially envisaged by any of the participants.  Notably, Young also envisages 
concernful interaction with the other having an outcome of this kind,23 while 
mistakenly assuming that a simple inversion of the symmetry requirement will suffice 
to achieve it. 
Notwithstanding its contribution to advancing the case for a dialogical 
reappropriation of the discourse model, the foregoing brief sketch of what dialogical 
engagement with the other entails clearly leaves much still to be worked out regarding 
the conditions of its possibility.  Reinforcing and extending Simpson’s insights, in the 
first instance it calls for endorsement of ‘dialogical equality’ and ‘comparable validity’ 
as postulates. 
TOWARD COMPARABLE VALIDITY AND DIALOGICAL EQUALITY 
Elaborating on the requisite conditions for productive dialogical interaction, Simpson 
highlights the need to take the other’s position seriously enough to count it as a 
potentially valuable response to a genuine concern that we and they both share, 
instead of dismissing it as having no identifiable relationship with our own concerns 
and interests.  This in turn commits us to investigating ‘the possible value of 
construing reality in its terms’, to the extent that, as ‘the addressee’, we assume the 
‘obligation of taking the claim seriously enough to enter, along with the sender, a 
dialogically constituted space of reasons and reasoning’.24  Intended to counteract a 
tendency peremptorily to dismiss the apparently unfamiliar or foreign, this injunction 
commits us to interpreting the other’s position in light of ‘the strongest case’ that can 
be made for it, mindful that ‘it is through discovering the real strength of [another’s] 
position that I can learn’ from it.25  Ultimately, then, participants in dialogue need to 
be prepared ‘to proceed as if they could learn from, and be challenged by, the 
other’.26  Reinforcing and extending Simpson’s assessment, a productive process of 
dialectical learning would seem to entail endorsement of ‘comparable validity’ and 
‘dialogical equality’ as postulates.27   
Briefly stated, these postulates stipulate that if the potential for enlarged 
understanding and transformative learning inherent in our engagement with 
                                                     
23 Young, ‘Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged Thought’., see 
especially secs V, VI. 
24 Simpson, The Unfinished Project: Toward a Postmetaphysical Humanism, p. 103. 
25 Ibid., p. 87. 
26 Ibid., p. 89. 
27 Cf. Paul Healy, ‘Self-Other Relations and the Rationality of Cultures’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 
26, 2000, pp. 61-83, pp. 65-8, 71-3. 
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difference is to be actualised, we need to allow others to articulate their own positions 
in their own terms and accord them the status of equal partners in the conjoint 
exploration of a topic, to the extent that we are prepared to allow their views actively 
to challenge our own ‘settled opinion’, to modify our preconceptions when they are 
found wanting, and to learn from what they have to tell us rather than simply 
asserting the superiority of our own viewpoint.  In short, commensurate with 
Simpson’s reversibility of perspectives, the point of these postulates is to enjoin us to 
stop treating those who occupy different discursive standpoints either as mirror 
images of ourselves or as denizens of a deficient socio-cultural standpoint who need to 
prove themselves to us before we will accord them a respectful hearing,28 and instead 
recognise that they represent a position comparable in value to our own from which 
we can productively learn.  Equally importantly, however, according the other’s 
position the status of comparable validity does not entail its equal validity.  On the 
contrary, as considered further below, the tenability of each party’s views needs to be 
held open to critical intersubjective appraisal in appropriately structured discursive 
forums.  Hence, a commitment to these postulates also presupposes an accountability 
requirement whereby each side remains committed to holding its beliefs, values and 
practices open to principled comparative evaluation by others who occupy different 
discursive standpoints and to effecting needed modifications when they are found 
wanting.  This requirement derives from a dialogical awareness that in our interaction 
with diversely situated others, we inevitably issue criticisable moral as well as 
epistemic claims which these diversely situated others are entitled to contest and 
challenge.  In short, the real point of these postulates is to open up a conceptual space 
for the principled comparative evaluation of proffered claims with a view to 
generating an enhanced and more finely tuned understanding of issues of mutual 
concern.  Indeed, the overall intent is to promote transformative learning through a 
commitment to finding and building on common ground while respecting and 
preserving difference.  From a dialogical perspective, it is in this way that we 
appropriately carry through on the cosmopolitan ideal of participating in the 
formulation of the laws and policies that regulate our lives while demonstrating a 
genuine respect for difference.  In other words, it is in this way that we truly 
contribute to the creation of a ‘cosmopolitan public sphere’.29 
                                                     
28 Notwithstanding its intent to be egalitarian and inclusive, it is difficult for the Habermasian discourse 
model to altogether avoid something of this condescending attitude to other cultures given its belief in 
what Simpson terms ‘the developmental superiority of the standpoint of modern procedural 
universalism’ (The Unfinished Project, p. 75). 
29 Hans-Herbert Kögler, ‘Constructing a Cosmopolitan Public Sphere: Hermeneutic Capabilities and 
Universal Values’, European Journal of Social Theory, vol. 8, no. 3, 2005, pp. 297-320. 
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Moreover, as we shall now consider, taking a commitment to dialogical equality 
and comparable validity seriously also entails reconceptualising the anticipated 
outcome of the deliberative process in terms of enlarged understanding and 
transformative learning rather than consensus, as the discourse model stipulates.   
TOWARD ENLARGED AND POTENTIALLY TRANSFORMED 
UNDERSTANDING 
As is well known, the ideal of a ‘rationally-motivated consensus’ represents another 
cornerstone of the Habermasian discourse model.  But while few would deny 
consensuality its merits, from a situated dialogical perspective, the problem is that the 
anticipation of an idealized consensus, which correlates closely in the original 
Habermasian template with the postulation of an ideal speech situation and a 
‘universal audience’, perpetuates the illusion of homogeneity, uniformity, and hence 
interchangeability of participant standpoints that pervades the discourse model and 
renders it unresponsive to difference.  Hence, although an orientation toward 
agreement does have an important role to play in giving impetus and direction to the 
deliberative process, an undue emphasis on consensus reinforces the impression that 
difference is ‘something to be transcended’ in the interests of achieving (or preserving) 
unity, and thus inadvertently functions as ‘another mechanism of exclusion’.30  
Moreover, in sidelining difference as an obstacle to unity, a heavily consensual 
orientation fails to factor in the crucial role that disagreement and difference have to 
play in promoting enlarged understanding and transformative learning and hence the 
indispensable contribution these can make to the emergence of creative new solutions 
to complex global problems.  Given these deficiencies, an unduly consensual 
orientation could be said to diminish rather than enhance the rationality as well as the 
moral legitimacy of the deliberative process.  As a corrective, endorsement of enlarged 
understanding as the primary guiding orientation has many advantages over 
consensus, and is altogether more compatible with the requirements of dialogical 
equality and comparable validity.   Let us consider further why this is the case. 
In the first instance, in reinforcing the homogenising presuppositions of the 
discourse model, a heavily consensual orientation accentuates the problems that we 
have seen to arise from valorising the generalised other at the expense of the concrete 
other.  In particular, a consensual orientation reinforces the homogenising 
presuppositions of the discourse model by focussing only on what we have in 
                                                     
30 Iris Marion Young, ‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’, in Seyla 
Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, Princeton, NJ, Princeton 
University Press, 1996, pp. 120-35, p. 126. 
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common, while the concept of a ‘universal audience, its Habermasian correlate, 
accentuates the assumed interchangeability of participant standpoints.  Through thus 
excluding from consideration the beliefs, values, and concerns of situated concrete 
others, a heavily consensual orientation reinforces this failure of the discourse model 
to live up to its own inclusiveness requirement.  The exclusionary tendencies of the 
Habermasian discourse model are further augmented by its restriction of participation 
to ‘postconventional agents’ who have eschewed particularist beliefs and values in 
favour of an exclusive concern with abstract norms, and who are both capable of and 
committed to making their case purely in argumentative terms.31  Furthermore, in 
thus focussing only on what we have in common to the exclusion of what 
differentiates us, the discourse model is epistemically as well as ethically flawed.  In 
particular, in excluding from consideration the situated knowledge that diversely 
situated participants could bring to the debate, the discourse model effectively 
precludes the possibility of achieving a textured understanding of the issues under 
consideration in their multifaceted complexity.  Here the problem is that in 
presupposing the homogeneity and interchangeability of participant standpoints, a 
heavily consensual orientation dispels the potential inherent in the encounter with 
difference to challenge entrenched presuppositions and fuel a productive learning 
process.  As Iris Young perceptively puts it, in thus one-sidedly focussing on ‘what 
discussants all share’ rather than engaging with difference in a way that allows the 
beliefs and values of the other to pose a challenge to our own settled opinions, it 
negates the very stimulus needed to cause participants ‘to revise their opinions or 
viewpoints in order to take account of perspectives and experiences beyond them’.  
Likewise, by reinforcing our tendency to view others as mirror images of ourselves, it 
obscures recognition of the situated and perspectival character of each participant’s 
viewpoint, thereby blunting our awareness that precisely because ‘the perspectives are 
beyond one another’, there is something important to be learned from proponents of 
other standpoints ‘as they communicate their meanings and perspectives’.32  
Consequently, an unduly consensual orientation cannot account for the fact that 
‘people’s ideas about political questions often change when they interact with other 
people’s ideas and experiences’, still less that their ideas ‘about the conclusion to 
collective problem solving are also sometimes transformed by listening to and learning 
about the point of view of others’.33   
                                                     
31 Cf. Shapcott, Justice, Community, and Dialogue in International Relations, pp. 122-23. 
32 Young, ‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’, p. 127.. 
33 Ibid., p. 125. 
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As a corrective, the primary regulative orientation needs to be reconceptualised in 
terms of a commitment to attaining an enriched and potentially transformed 
understanding of issues of mutual concern through engaging in appropriately 
structured processes of dialogical interaction, whereby each side strives to achieve a 
well-grounded understanding of the other’s animating concerns and their supporting 
rationale.  As Young has it, through thus ‘listening across difference’, ‘each position 
can come to understand something about the ways proposals and claims affect others 
differently situated’; and ‘by internalizing this mediated understanding of plural 
positions’, participants can gain ‘a wider picture of the social processes in which their 
own partial experience is embedded.’  Moreover, engagement in such a process of 
mutual learning is by no means a mere optional adjunct, since, as Young points out, 
the ‘greater social objectivity’ that results is a necessary prerequisite ‘for arriving at 
just solutions to collective problems’.34  Notably too, this outcome can not be achieved 
simply by endeavouring imaginatively to trade places with the other nor even, as we 
have seen, by favouring asymmetrical over symmetrical reciprocity, but only by 
engaging in what Simpson terms ‘genuinely symmetrical’ learning processes,35 
grounded in active critical engagement with the other in appropriately structured 
dialogical forums.  Embarked on under these conditions the encounter with difference 
becomes a major stimulus to the development of enlarged understanding through 
revealing one’s own construal of the problem domain as perspectival relative to that of 
differently situated others.  In so doing, it alerts us to the need to factor in their 
perspective alongside ours if we are to respond to the situation in a way that can do 
justice to the needs, values, and interests of all concerned.  Moreover, provided 
participants are truly committed to finding creative and inclusive solutions to the 
problems confronting them, these dialectical exchanges can support an interactive 
learning process that can transform their whole way of thinking about the problem 
domain.  Indeed, as indicated earlier, under these conditions participants can undergo 
a ‘fusion of horizons’ whereby, as Taylor puts it, they learn ‘to move in a broader 
horizon, within which what [they] have formerly taken for granted as the background 
to valuation can be situated as one possibility alongside the different background of 
the formerly unfamiliar [position]’.36  As thus conducive to promoting a fusion of 
horizons incorporating the best insights deriving from multiple perspectives, a 
dialectical exchange of views embarked on under appropriate dialogical conditions 
                                                     
34 Ibid., p. 128, Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 
111-17.. 
35 Simpson, The Unfinished Project: Toward a Postmetaphysical Humanism, p. 75. 
36 Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, in Amy Gutman (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the 
‘Politics of Recognition’, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 25-73, p. 67. 
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enables participants to develop a new ‘situation definition’, an ‘enlarged’ mode of 
understanding, embodying creative new possibilities for responding to a problematic 
situation, possibilities that transcend, and indeed transform, those initially available to 
any of the participants.   
The revised orientation also incorporates several other notable advantages.  Most 
importantly from the perspective of present concerns, an orientation toward enlarged 
understanding has the decisive advantage of embracing difference as a resource rather 
than excluding it as barrier to the consensual validation of universal norms.  
Specifically, it achieves this outcome by challenging the presumed interchangeability 
of participant standpoints in favour of engaging with difference in a manner 
compatible with the postulates of comparable validity and dialogical equality.  In so 
doing, it demonstrates a clear recognition that genuine understanding can only be 
achieved by engaging with participants in their situated particularity.  Correlatively, it 
corrects for a one-sided preoccupation with the consensual validation of abstract 
norms, by allowing the full range of issues of concern to the parties to the debate to be 
opened up for consideration.  Notably too, disagreement and difference are valorised 
at the end of the process as well as the beginning.  Thus, while the forging of a new 
situation definition signifies the achievement of a shared, more adequate framework 
of understanding to which diversely situated participants can subscribe as best 
articulating the parameters of the problem situation to the extent possible under 
current discursive conditions, differences may still persist about specific issues as well 
as about the overall adequacy of the interpretive framework arrived at.37  At the same 
time, endorsement of enlarged understanding over consensus does not preclude 
reaching agreement when agreement is possible and desirable.38  However, it does 
alert us to the fact that, contrary to the guiding presupposition of the discourse model, 
enhanced understanding is likely to be a prerequisite for achieving a tenable and 
enduring consensus.39  Accordingly, the revised telos has the decisive advantage that, 
instead of being rejected as an obstacle to consensus, the persistence of disagreement 
and difference is embraced as a stimulus to ongoing dialectical interaction aimed at 
achieving an increasingly attuned and textured understanding of the problem domain 
                                                     
37 Importantly, however, as Walhof points out, any residual disagreement is ‘of a different sort than that 
which existed prior to dialogue’, given that participants now ‘view the subject differently than before by 
virtue of having engaged in dialogue’.  It is the type of disagreement that eventuates when we ‘agree to 
disagree’, such that ‘we now have a better and deeper understanding of its nature and what it might take 
to resolve it’ (‘Bringing the Deliberative Back in’, p.165). 
38 Cf. Shapcott, Justice, Community, and Dialogue in International Relations, pp. 147-48. 
39 Cf. Charles Taylor, ‘Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights’, in Joanne Bauer and 
Daniel Bell (eds.), The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, 
pp. 124-44, pp. 137, 138. 
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under consideration, thereby paving the way for a response that it is better attuned to 
the complexities of the situation. 
SOME CONTRASTS WITH SHAPCOTT  
As noted early on, while the dialogical model here being delineated has considerable 
affinities with the version defended by Shapcott in virtue of their shared allegiance to 
Gadamerian hermeneutics, there are some significant points of differences as well.  In 
the present context, the following are especially noteworthy.   
(1) Although Shapcott also defends the merits of reaching understanding with 
diversely situated others over the one-sided consensuality of the discourse model, 
he significantly underestimates its transformative potential.  Specifically, in failing 
to differentiate reaching understanding sharply enough from coming to stand in 
the other’s shoes, he does not do justice to the possibility of developing a new, and 
potentially transformed, framework of understanding through conjoint dialogical 
interaction with the other. 
(2) While Shapcott emphatically defends the characterisation of the dialogue 
model as ‘thin’ as opposed to ‘thick’, acknowledgement of its hermeneutic 
underpinnings and of the distinctive strengths that differentiate it from the 
discourse model requires that it be characterised as ‘thick’ as well as ‘thin’.   
Brief elaboration on these significant points of contrast with Shapcott will provide the 
opportunity to further clarify the distinctive strengths of the dialogue model here 
being delineated and to further differentiate it from the discourse model. 
On the need to accommodate transformative learning 
Firstly, while Shapcott explicitly acknowledges the centrality of the concept of a 
‘fusion of horizons’,40 he significantly underestimates its transformative implications, 
due to equating reaching understanding with attaining comprehensibility through 
putting ourselves in the other’s shoes.  Thus, on the one hand, he acknowledges that 
the ‘shared meaning’ arrived at through a fusion of horizons is ‘in an important sense, 
something new that exceeds and transforms the previous horizons’.41  But, on the 
other hand, he undercuts this transformative potential by maintaining that 
‘understanding oriented towards agreement’ ‘means simply that the self can 
“understand” the other’s' point of view and has successfully “stood in the other’s 
                                                     
40 Shapcott, Justice, Community, and Dialogue in International Relations., see especially pp. 143-44. 
41 Ibid., p. 143. 
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shoes”'.42  In so doing, he overlooks not only Young's critique of symmetrical 
reciprocity, but also Gadamer's own strong reservations about our ability to put 
ourselves in the other’s shoes.43  Moreover, in failing to differentiate the kind of 
enlarged understanding achievable through a fusion of horizons from mere 
comprehensibility, Shapcott effectively discounts the possibility of transformative 
learning.  For as we have seen, genuine dialogical interaction with the other 
culminating in a fusion of horizons signifies much more than simply coming to 
appreciate the other’s' viewpoint; it also—and indeed primarily—entails a willingness 
to learn from it to the extent of having one’s understanding of the situation 
transformed.  Accordingly, what is lost sight of by settling for mere comprehensibility 
is the realisation that through open and sincere dialogical engagement with the other, 
we can become ‘transformed into a communion in which we do not remain what we 
were’.44  As elaborated by Walhof,45 the crucial consideration here is that, on 
dialogical principles, ‘once we are drawn in, we do not escape without being changed 
in some sense.  In a genuine conversation, we cannot assert our views and continue to 
hold them in the same way that we did upon entering the dialogue.  Rather, the act of 
engaging in conversation transforms these views or leads to the articulation of new 
truths of which we were previously unaware’, ie. to a depth of understanding, not 
previously available to any of the (diversely situated) participants.  Importantly, then, 
in overlooking this factor we negate the possibility of attaining the kind of 
multiperspectival social knowledge that Young valorises as necessary to transcend the 
situated knowledge initially available to any of the participants and which, because of 
its more textured attunement to the problem domain, is a necessary prerequisite ‘for 
arriving at just solutions to collective problems’.  Since this would be to the detriment 
of the dialogue model’s ability to function as an effective template for situated 
cosmopolitanism, it is crucial that this distinctive transformative potential is 
preserved.46  As we have seen, however, to render this outcome possible, we have to 
                                                     
42 Ibid., p. 171; cf. also pp. 144, 145. 
43 Compare Walhof: ‘Gadamer represents this as a fusion because he wants to distinguish his approach 
from the idea that understanding is achieved by transposing oneself into the other’s' point of view’ 
(‘Bringing the Deliberative Back in’, p. 164; cf. also p.173, n. 4: ‘Gadamer thinks this kind of transposition 
[i.e. ‘putting oneself in the position of another’] is impossible’).   
44 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall, 2nd ed., New 
York, Continuum, 1989, p. 379. 
45 Walhof, ‘Bringing the Deliberative Back In: Gadamer on Conversation and Understanding’, p. 166. 
46 For an independent defence of the importance of such a transformative ‘moment’ in a contemporary 
cosmopolitanism context, see further Delanty, ‘The Cosmopolitan Imagination: Critical 
Cosmopolitanism and Social Theory’., especially pp. 35, 42, 44; cf. also Delanty, ‘Models of European 
Identity: Reconciling Universalism and Particularism’., p. 351. 
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go beyond aiming at mere comprehensibility or even symmetrical reciprocity towards 
engaging with the other on a basis not only of dialogical equality--and hence in a 
manner commensurate with ‘having their truth claims recognised’ (as Shapcott 
stipulates47)--but also of comparable validity, such that we take the others’ truth (and 
rightness) claims seriously enough to allow them to challenge our own settled views 
about the matter, thereby paving the way for the achievement of an enlarged 
understanding through a productive fusion of horizons.  
On the need to construe the dialogue model as ‘thick’ as well as ‘thin’ 
Likewise, while Shapcott is emphatic in defending the thinness of the dialogue model, 
the foregoing analysis underscores the need for it to be characterised as both ‘thick’ and 
‘thin’ if it is to live up to its commitment to engaging with situated others in a manner 
conducive to learning from them.  Since the issues at stake here go well beyond the 
semantic, the matter warrants further consideration, beginning with a brief reprise of 
Shapcott’s rationale for preferring ‘thinness’ over ‘thickness’.48 
In keeping with Linklater’s characterisation of the discourse model, Shapcott is 
emphatic that the dialogue model must be construed as thin because, in 
foregrounding the commonalities that unite us rather than the particularities that 
separate us, thinness is a necessary prerequisite for genuine openness to otherness.49  
In contrast, for Shapcott, ‘thickness’ designates a strong communitarian-style 
attachment to shared beliefs and values which constitutes a barrier to open 
engagement with otherness.  On this analysis, since thickness is construed as being at 
odds with the openness that is rightly deemed a sine qua non for genuine dialogical 
engagement with others, thinness must be valorised to the exclusion of thickness.  But 
while openness to otherness is indeed a necessary prerequisite for genuine dialogical 
engagement with others, a one-sided emphasis on thinness fails to do justice to the 
factor that primarily differentiates the dialogue from the discourse model, namely, its 
commitment, on both epistemic and ethical grounds, to engaging with concrete others 
on a basis of comparable validity and dialogical equality in a manner conducive to 
learning from otherness in its situated particularity.  To rectify this shortcoming, 
instead of being taken as the exclusive benchmark, procedural thinness, appropriate 
                                                     
47 Shapcott, Justice, Community, and Dialogue in International Relations, p. 172. 
48 Ibid., see especially ch. 6 
49 The advantages of procedural thinness noted by Shapcott include: ‘openness to conversational 
engagement’; being ‘consistent with a variety of different forms of association’ (Ibid., p. 220); not 
legislating ‘the dimensions of the cosmopolitanism community that it aspires to’, nor ‘the outcome of 
conversation itself’ (Ibid., p. 221). 
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only for characterising relations between generalised others,50 must be 
counterbalanced by thick engagement with concrete others in their situated 
particularity.  Moreover, the whole thrust of Shapcott’s own hermeneutic defence of 
the dialogue model supports this assessment.51  Crucially, then, it must be 
acknowledged that it is only through thick engagement with situated others that real 
learning of the sort valorised on a hermeneutic analysis and epitomised in terms of a 
fusion of horizons can occur.  Accordingly, we may conclude that while procedural 
thinness is indeed a necessary prerequisite for genuine engagement with difference, on 
a thoroughgoing dialogical analysis it will not suffice to settle for thinness.  Instead, 
while incorporating procedurally thin ground rules conducive to facilitating dialogical 
interaction with diversely situated others on an equitable basis, the dialogue model 
must likewise reflect a strong commitment to engaging with and learning from 
concrete others in their situated particularity on a basis of comparable validity as well 
as dialogical equality. Hence, to do justice to what differentiates the dialogue from the 
discourse model, it must be construed as thick as well as thin. 
Finally, by way of consolidating the case for a dialogical reappropriation of the 
discourse model, let us now consider why, and how, transformative dialogue can 
provide a more fitting template for situated cosmopolitanism than can discursive 
deliberation. 
                                                     
50 As Delanty aptly puts it, ‘the disadvantage’ with such an approach is that it is ‘a minimal identity of 
form rather than of content in that it expresses only a common denominator’ (‘Models of European 
Identity: Reconciling Universalism and Particularism’, p. 348).; and hence needs to be counterbalanced 
by a thick particularism. 
51 In particular, this is epitomised in his hermeneutic analysis of ‘the historicity and linguisticality of 
human experience’, and of the (situated) I-Thou relationship that it supports and which functions as a 
precondition for a meaningful and productive ‘fusion of horizons’ (see especially Shapcott, Justice, 
Community, and Dialogue in International Relations., 136f).  In this connection, Shapcott systematically 
documents the reasons why dialogical interaction must be construed as taking place between situated 
agents in their concrete particularity (ie. as embedded in their socio-culturally constituted lifeworld) and 
as actively engaging their distinctive prejudgments and prejudices--and consequently as a ‘thick’, and not 
just as a ‘thin’ mode of interaction between generalised others regulated only by procedural ground rules 
that abstract from their lifeworld particularities, as the discourse model specifically enjoins.  Reprised at 
several junctures (e.g., pp.150-52, 161f), this hermeneutic recognition of the need for a textured I-Thou 
relationship between situated participants involving their particularity, their concerns, their horizons of 
meaning is pivotal for Shapcott’s analysis.  It is epitomised in his acknowledgment that, unlike the 
discourse model, the dialogue model ‘preserves the emphasis on the abstract other while being more 
inclusive of concrete otherness.  It is abstract in that it is oriented towards the possibility of understanding 
any and all linguistically constituted agents and yet concrete because understanding requires an 
engagement with all the particularity of agents and their concerns, their horizons of meaning’ (p. 173; 
emphasis in the original). 
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TOWARD TRANSFORMATIVE DIALOGUE 
As contended throughout, the raison d’etre for a dialogical reappropriation of the 
discourse model is to rectify the injustice done to diversely situated others by denying 
them the right to have their distinctive voices heard and factored into deliberations 
about matters that affect their well being.  As we have seen, to remedy the deficiencies 
of the discourse model, the dialogical template valorises the need not only to treat 
diversely situated others as equal partners in dialogue but also to accord their views 
comparable validity to our own.  To complete the picture, a further step is needed, 
namely, to motivate the case for valorising transformative dialogue over deliberative 
discourse as the more appropriate template.  Here again, Young perceptively 
pinpoints the rationale for this reformulation.   
In addition to the factors already considered, a further defining feature of the 
discourse model is its commitment to the formulation and vindication of proffered 
claims and proposals in purely argumentative terms.  Indeed, for Habermas, it is this 
unequivocal commitment to the ‘unforced force of the better argument’ that renders 
the deliberative process rational and confers on it its authority.  But whatever its 
merits, Young’s overarching concern is that as thus defined, deliberative discourse is 
too formal and rigid a means of communication to enable a diversity of cultural, and 
other, groupings to articulate their needs and interests effectively.  Since an 
unqualified focus on such a delimited and exclusive style of self-presentation inevitably 
disadvantages the multiplicity of socio-cultural groupings to whom this style of 
communication is unfamiliar or foreign, it runs counter to the discourse model’s 
inclusiveness requirement,52 and does little to promote mutual understanding or 
transformative learning.  Hence to ensure that a diversity of voices genuinely gain a 
hearing, this one-sided preoccupation with argumentation needs to be 
reconceptualised so as to accommodate more informal, narrative styles of 
communication which can enable participants to articulate and effectively 
communicate their distinctive experiences and perspectives in their own terms to 
others who occupy different socio-cultural standpoints.  To this end, Young advocates 
the need to include ‘greeting’, ‘rhetoric’, and ‘narrative’ as important modes of 
communication, needed to ensure that participants gain a hearing as equal dialogue 
partners and that their views are not just heard but appreciated on their merits and 
correspondingly factored into the deliberative process.53  In addition to enhancing 
                                                     
52 Young, ‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’, pp. 123-4, cf.Young, 
Inclusion and Democracy, pp. 37-40. 
53 Young, ‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’, pp. 128-32, Young, Inclusion 
and Democracy., ch. 2 
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inclusiveness, acknowledgment of the legitimacy of diverse narrative styles 
significantly enhances the prospects for transformative learning through making 
available from each perspective ‘the situated knowledge’ available to differently 
situated participants, such that ‘the combination of narratives from different 
perspectives produces the collective social wisdom not available from any one 
position’.54  This paves the way for a fusion of horizons and the emergence of a new 
situation definition embodying creative new possibilities for thought and action, along 
the lines heretofore delineated.  Indeed, through thus facilitating the interplay 
between diverse viewpoints, the liberalizing of permissible modes of communication 
has a crucial role to play in facilitating a thoroughgoing transformation in outlook 
whereby ‘participants can come to see one another in new ways; problems can be 
redefined and reformulated; opportunities can be clarified; priorities can be reordered 
individually and collectively’.55  In contrast to argumentatively grounded deliberation 
in its more restrictive Habermasian sense, these more inclusive, informal and loosely 
textured modes of communication are more appropriately conceptualised as 
‘structured conversation’, or dialogue, with transformative potential.  But 
notwithstanding their significance, Young initially overstepped the mark in calling for 
‘an equal privileging of any forms of communicative interaction where people aim to 
reach understanding’.56  Instead, as she now acknowledges, it needs to be recognised 
that ‘argument is a necessary element of public discussion that aims to make just and 
wise decisions’ through enabling participants to ‘question one another, test one 
another’s claims and opinions through discussion, and have an account of why they 
assent’.57  A fortiori, a commitment to transformative learning entails that we cannot 
simply dispense with argumentative ground rules, designed as they are to ensure that 
contending positions are evaluated on their merits rather than endorsed on merely 
arbitrary or strategic grounds.   
But if argumentation thus cannot be dispensed with, given its inherently if 
inadvertently, monological character on the Habermasian template,58 the operative 
conception nonetheless stands in need of dialogical reappropriation so as to render it 
more genuinely responsive to difference and correspondingly conducive to mutual 
                                                     
54 Young, ‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’, pp. 131-2, cf. Young, 
Inclusion and Democracy, pp. 70-7. 
55 John Forester, ‘Beyond Dialogue and Transformative Learning’, in Stephen Esquith (ed.), Political 
Dialogue: Theories and Practices, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1996, pp. 295-333, p. 323. 
56 Young, ‘Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy’, p. 125. 
57 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 56. 
58 Healy, Rationality, Hermeneutics and Dialogue: Toward a Viable Postfoundationalist Account of Rationality, pp. 23-
4. 
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learning.  As already noted, Simpson epitomises the need for such a reappropriation 
in pointing out that what the ‘respectful understanding of another’ actually calls for is 
a willingness to embark on ‘a mutual dialectic of recognition’, whereby each side’ 
strives to attain ‘an understanding of what the other takes herself to be doing’, and 
where each ‘can raise critical questions about the other’s position’ and issue 
‘reciprocal rejoinders’.59  At a minimum, what is needed to underwrite this outcome is 
a style of argumentation that allows for a process of ‘cross-arguing’ and ‘cross-
justification’ grounded in a principle of ‘symmetrical mutuality’, whereby contending 
parties ‘play the same double role as a protagonist/antagonist’ and ‘bear the same 
burden of justification’,60 and indeed the same responsibility for mutual learning.  
Only genuinely dialogical ground rules of this sort have the potential to underwrite 
‘reciprocal learning processes guided by critical evaluations’, which can both apprise 
us of ‘the nature and limits of our own presuppositions’ and challenge us ‘to review the 
world we had taken for granted’.61  This is because only such ground rules can ensure 
that participants remain genuinely responsive to critical feedback emanating from a 
diversity of standpoints, and hence remain open to the emergence of potentially 
transformative new ways of conceptualising the issues at stake, along the lines 
heretofore delineated.   
As noted at the outset, far from being an external imposition the reforms here 
argued for are aimed at liberating the dialogical potential already inherent in the 
discourse model but typically masked by its undue emphasis on homogeneity, 
uniformity and consensus.  Given its altogether more interactive, inclusive and 
conjoint character, a mode of dialogical interaction incorporating the needed reforms 
is more appropriately conceptualized as structured conversation with transformative 
potential than as consensually oriented deliberation, as envisaged on the discourse 
model.  Such a dialogically reconfigured template has a far greater capacity than the 
discourse model to achieve a primary desideratum of truly worthwhile 
cosmopolitanism discourse, namely that of not simply ‘throwing together a group of 
rational decision-makers’, but of ‘changing these decision-makers into a more 
deliberative political body’, grounded in a ‘deliberative political rationality, in which 
means and ends and self and other are transformed’.62  Given its capacity to exemplify 
a genuine respect for difference and in the process enhance the prospects for the 
emergence of creative new solutions to collective problems, transformative dialogue 
                                                     
59 Simpson, The Unfinished Project: Toward a Postmetaphysical Humanism, p. 80. 
60 Yameng Liu, ‘Justifying My Position in Your Terms’, Argumentation, vol. 13, 1999, pp. 297-315, pp. 309-
12. 
61 Simpson, The Unfinished Project: Toward a Postmetaphysical Humanism, p. 75. 
62 Forester, ‘Beyond Dialogue and Transformative Learning’, p. 324. 
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can judiciously claim to provide a more fitting template for a situated 
cosmopolitanism capable of meeting the needs of an increasingly pluralistic and 
globalised world than does the Habermasian discourse model, notwithstanding the 
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